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In late 2007 and early 2008, Kenya erupted into chaos following its closely contested and flawed general 
elections.  Kenya has long been a key economic and political ally of the United States (U.S.).  As such, 
with the 2012 elections looming, the United States has an important role to play in preventing a repeat of 
the violence that devastated Kenya and rocked all of East Africa. 
 
 
Underlying Causes of Conflict 
 
Certain structural weaknesses in Kenya’s government have repeatedly turned national elections into 
flashpoints of conflict.  However, the severity of the most recent outbreak of violence suggests that deeper 
grievances are driving the conflict.  At independence, political parties formed along ethnic lines, 
transforming competition for executive power into ethnopolitical rivalry.  Additionally, post-colonial land 
distribution favored certain tribes over others, thus fostering the rise of inequality between ethnic groups 





A vast literature has analyzed how economic inequality and ethnopolitical identity affect conflict 
independently.  However, evidence from Kenya contends that the interplay between the two is far more 
important.  Quantitative analysis reveals that local levels of violence throughout Kenya increased with the 
severity of horizontal inequity.  Furthermore, narratives from the conflict corroborate the statistical 
results, as symbols of horizontal inequity were key targets of violence.  These findings offer a model to 
predict the locations at greatest risk of violence in 2012 and beyond, thus enabling precise targeting of 





Adopting a local-level policy approach will facilitate peace building in a bottom-up process, enhancing its 
legitimacy to both political elites and the broader Kenyan population.  Although Kenya has the ultimate 
responsibility to prevent, or manage, future civil conflict, the government would benefit from U.S. policy 
initiatives, such as: 
 
 supporting local mediation strategies by offering financial, training, and logistical assistance to 
build the rapid response capacity of Kenyan peace organizations; 
 increasing foreign assistance for non-agricultural local development projects; 
 continuing to support Kenya’s constitutional reform process and emphasizing that enhanced 
accountability will boost U.S. willingness to increase development assistance; 
 imposing direct sanctions on the perpetrators of the 2007-08 violence and threatening similar 





Civil conflict had already surfaced in some areas of Kenya in the months leading up to the 2007 general 
elections, but when the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) announced on December 30 that President 
Mwai Kibaki had defeated challenger Raila Odinga for re-election, the country exploded.  Violence raged 
throughout the country.  According to the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), 136 
of the country’s 210 electoral constituencies suffered violence.  This scenario was not new to Kenya, as 
conflict had followed each of the preceding presidential elections in 1992, 1997, and 2002.  The scale of 
bloodshed over only a few months of active conflict in 2007-08, however, was disturbingly unique.1 
 
Although not a new development, the overt ethnic antagonism at the core of the conflict was further cause 
for alarm.  Hate rhetoric was widely used to incite violence.  One leaflet distributed in the Burnt Forest 
area of the Rift Valley in early January 2008 warned members of the Kikuyu tribe, “Rift Valley is our 
land which we were given by god, as you were given Central region.  When you come back to Rift-Valley 
bid your families fare well.  We will not fear any Police.  DEATH DEATH IS HERE!”  Weeks later, in 
the nearby town of Eldoret, a Kalenjin elder echoed the sentiment.  “We will not sit down and see one 
ethnic group lead Kenya.  This is a war, we will start a war.”2 
 
The rapid eruption of violence and its explicitly ethnic basis were frightening indicators that Kenya was, 
and may continue to be, on the brink of state collapse.  U.S. President George W. Bush and Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice both suggested in early February 2008 that Kenya was displaying the “warning 
signs” of genocide.3  Notably, this assessment came only days after Rwandan President Paul Kagame 
called for military intervention into Kenya to stave off further slaughter and the potential outbreak of 
genocide: 
 
It starts with five deaths, then 10, then 50, shortly it grows to 100, then it goes to 
thousands….  By the time you realise [sic], it has a dimension that is wiping out life in 
villages and communities and is getting out of control….  When you look at the numbers 
of people that are being killed, how they are being killed…  In the wake of such senseless 
killings with no immediate solution, if anybody suggested that [military] option to me, I 
would say I agree with it….  It is not too late for Kenyans to look back and see how our 
country went down the drain in the past.4 
 
KNCHR’s assessment of the conflict a year and a half later similarly observed, “The threat of genocide 
taking place in Kenya in [the] future is real.  Key characteristics or signals that a society is likely to 
commit genocide have been present in Kenya for a while now.”5 
 
                                                            
1 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Rights Account 
of Kenya’s Post-2007 Election Violence (KNCHR, August 2008), 3, 19. 
2 Ibid., 71. 
3 Simon Kasyate, “Bush Warns Leaders on Genocide,” Kenya Today, 02/19/2008, http://www.ogiek.org/news-
4/news-post-08-02-661.htm (accessed March 6, 2010). 
4 Arthur Asiimwe, “INTERVIEW-Rwanda Suggests Military Option for Kenya Crisis,” Reuters, 01/30/2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL30119639 (accessed March 6, 2010). 
5 KNCHR, 154. 
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To clarify these signals and to prevent a return to the brink of genocide, this study explores the micro-
level causes and manifestations of Kenya’s 2007-08 election violence.  The paper will proceed by 
outlining U.S. interests in Kenyan stability, providing a brief overview of the conflict, and discussing the 
underlying causes of the violence.  From there, quantitative analysis of micro-level conflict data and 
qualitative evidence from conflict narratives will identify and evaluate the local patterns of violence that 
emerged and the implications they have for U.S. conflict prevention efforts.  The paper will then conclude 
by reviewing potential policy options and offering recommendations for preventing a repeat of the 





Beyond the globally shared moral responsibility to prevent future genocide, the United States has clear 
national interests in controlling the outbreak and escalation of violence in Kenya.  Speaking at the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) only months after the violence in Kenya subsided, defeated 
candidate Raila Odinga echoed the widely held observation that his country had long been “known as an 
oasis of peace and stability in a region plagued by a history of conflict.”6  The 2010 Congressional Budget 
Justification for Foreign Operations highlights Kenya’s “role as a stable partner and contributor to 
regional peace and security.”7  Kenya has indeed been a valuable partner for the United States.  In 
addition to aiding counterterrorism efforts on the Horn of Africa, Kenya has been a regional leader in 
mediating the Sudanese civil war and reconstructing the Somali state.8  The 2007-08 election violence, 
however, undermined confidence in Kenya’s ability to maintain its role as a regional stabilizer. 
 
In addition to broadly benefiting from regional stability, the United States also has a direct economic 
stake in Kenyan security.  Ever since the Kenya-Uganda railroad was built in the early 1900s to link the 
deep-sea port at Mombasa with the Great Lakes interior, Kenya has served as a major regional and 
international trade hub, described in the 2011 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations 
as “the economic powerhouse of East Africa and an important commercial transportation gateway.”9  In 
recent years, however, the U.S. economic relationship with Kenya has been challenged by the arrival of 
                                                            
6 Raila Odinga, “Kenya: A Way Forward,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Statesmen’s Forum, 
June 17, 2008; Makau Mutua, Kenya’s Quest for Democracy: Taming Leviathan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2008), 5;  Mwangi Kimenyi and Njuguna Ndung’u, “Sporadic Ethnic Violence: Why Has Kenya Not 
Experienced a Full-Blown Civil War?,” in Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, Vol. 1—Africa, 
edited by Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2005), 124; Jeffrey 
Gettleman, “Signs in Kenya of a Land Redrawn by Ethnicity,” The New York Times, 02/15/2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/15/world/africa/15kenya.html?_r=1 (accessed March 6, 2010); “Why Kenya 
Went Up in Flames,” Nairobi Star, 03/06/2008. 
7 U.S. Department of State, “Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2010, Book II” 
(CBJ 2010), released May 2009, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/124072.pdf (accessed March 6, 
2010), 75. 
8 Mutua, 5. 
9 U.S. Department of State, “Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2011, Annex: 
Regional Perspectives” (CBJ 2011), released March 2010, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/137937.pdf (accessed April 23, 2010); for a geographical 
description of the channeling of regional transportation networks into Mombasa, see Edward Soja, The 
Geography of Modernization in Kenya: A Spatial Analysis of Social, Economic, and Political Change, Syracuse 
Geographical Series No. 2 (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1968), 27-36. 
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China.  Highlighting China’s rising investments and the Kenyan Parliament’s public support for China’s 
2005 anti-secession law, Donovan Chau argues that China is pursuing political warfare in Africa by 
deliberately attacking U.S. interests.10  While Chau overstates the case for militant intent, China is 
challenging U.S. interests.  The breadth of Chinese investment and the expected future influx of dollars 
from growing nations, such as India and Brazil, undermine U.S. influence in Kenya.  This new investment 
comes with fewer political development strings attached, especially related to implementing democratic 
reforms and fighting rampant corruption.11  As such, the United States has real stakes, beyond regional 
security, in preventing future conflict and maintaining close economic ties to Kenya. 
 
 
2007-08 Civil Conflict in Kenya 
 
The foundation for Kenya’s 2007-08 election violence is evident in its ethnopolitical history and current 
landscape.  Tribal affiliation is the primary social demarcation between groups in Kenya; and thus, ethnic 
identity has dictated the composition of political parties since independence.12  However, Kenya is an 





As Table 1 reveals, no single group enjoys a numerical majority.  As such, the structure of ethnic 
alliances has determined political power from independence onward.13 
 
Joshua Forrest observes that the patterns of political competition that developed are suggestive of a 
strongly “subnationalist” environment, characterized by “the creation of alliances among separated 
communities… multiple identity groups” in order to mobilize for greater autonomy.  In an international 
political system that discourages loyalties below the nation-state level, Kenyan ethnic alliances formed to 
                                                            
10 Donovan Chau, “Political Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: U.S. Capabilities and Chinese Operations in Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa” (Strategic Studies Institute, March 2007), 27-34. 
11 Harold Miller, personal e-mail correspondence, March 16, 2010. 
12 Jeni Klugman, “Kenya: Economic Decline and Ethnic Politics,” in War, Hunger, and Displacement: The Origins 
of Humanitarian Emergencies, Volume 2: Case Studies, edited by E. Wayne Nafziger, et al. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 296-297. 
13 Klugman, 297-298, 329. 
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compete for control of the state, as opposed to secession rights.14  Forrest highlights the minority Maasai’s 
dominance of the Rift Valley in pre-colonial Kenya, as well as Kikuyu recruitment among the Embu, 
Meru, and Maasai to form an anti-colonial rebellion as early examples of this ethnopolitical alliance 
structure at work.15  The shifting nature of these subnationalist ethnic alliances has produced a fluid 
landscape of group identities and loyalties that enjoy local supremacy and vie for national influence. 
 
As of the 2007 election, Kenyan political geography consisted of 8 provinces, 70 districts, and 210 
electoral constituencies, many of which were dominated by a single ethnic group or alliance.  Utilizing 
geographic information system (GIS) software, Figure 1 maps the ethnopolitical landscape of Kenya 
during the 2007 election season.16  “Incumbent Dominance” and “Opposition Dominance” portray 
support for Kibaki’s and Odinga’s respective ethnic alliances.17  Notably, the areas of balance in the 




This geographical polarization of ethnopolitical groups is evident in voting patterns.  In a study on 
electoral choices in Kenya, Michael Bratton and Mwangi Kimenyi argue that ethnicity is only one factor 
“among several relevant determinants of partisanship.”  They emphasize that 80% of Kenyans self-
                                                            
14 Joshua Forrest, Subnationalism in Africa: Ethnicity, Alliances, and Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2004), 14, 54. 
15 Ibid., 37, 55. 
16 Based on vote data from Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), “Kenya: ECK Official Election Results,” ECK, 
December 2007, http://aceproject.org/regions-en/countries-and-territories/KE/reports/ (accessed March 7, 2010).   
17 A 3rd party candidate received a majority of votes (over 80% in every case) in the Eastern Province districts of 
Makueni, Machakos, Kitui, and Mwingi (green areas surrounding Nairobi), and Kacheliba Constituency in West 
Pokot District, Rift Valley Province. 
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identify themselves as “non-ethnics” or “Kenyans,” rather than “ethnics.”  However, when describing 
their co-nationals, the results change dramatically.  Asked to explain what motivated other Kenyans’ party 
allegiance entering the 2007 election, 50% of respondents cited the candidate’s ethnic origin.  This 
percentage is higher, by far, than either of the last two elections in 2002 and 1997.  Regression analysis 
bears this out, as respondents’ ethnicities proved to be significant predictors of their support, or lack 





As expected from analyses of ethnopolitical dynamics in Kenya, the 2007 elections unfolded in a torrent 
of party realignment.  Although 118 political parties registered to compete (9 in the presidential election), 
only 3 had significant followings.  Entering 2007, the previous ethnopolitical alliance of incumbent 
President Kibaki had disintegrated largely due to a fight over constitutional reform.  However, by August, 
President Kibaki had formed a new coalition, the Party of National Unity (PNU), based on Kikuyu loyalty 
and augmented by regional partners pieced together from the previous incumbent alliance.  The 
opposition coalesced around Luo challenger Raila Odinga and the Orange Democratic Movement 
(ODM), as well as a splinter group (ODM-K) that enjoyed support exclusively among the Kamba.19  As 
Makau Mutua observes, “Odinga assembled… the largest collection of ethnic barons and baronesses in 
the land” including key representatives from the Kalenjin and Luhya tribes in order to challenge President 
Kibaki’s realigned incumbency alliance.20 
 
The campaign was bitterly contested in mass public rallies and through the media, and each candidate 
sought to enflame ethnic loyalty among supportive communities.21  Additionally, opinion polls were 
utilized to a far greater extent than ever before.  They consistently showed Odinga leading President 
Kibaki, though not always by more than the margin of error.  This instilled the belief in many of Odinga’s 
supporters that victory was inevitable, and would later underscore charges that the ultimately triumphant 
President Kibaki stole the election.22  The misuse of state resources by the Kibaki campaign compounded 
such accusations of misconduct.  KNCHR tallied 141 cases of government vehicles and 2 cases of state 
helicopters being used for campaign purposes.  Furthermore, of the airtime devoted to political 
candidates, the state-owned Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) allocated 76% of radio coverage and 
71% of television coverage to the PNU.  By contrast, ODM and ODM-K received only 13% and 6% of 
radio coverage, and only 11% and 5% of television coverage, respectively.23 
 
Despite the clear misconduct and emergence of scattered violence during the campaign, election day 
proceeded in a manner described by international observers as “generally calm, organized and 
                                                            
18 Michael Bratton and Mwangi Kimenyi, “Voting in Kenya: Putting Ethnicity in Perspective,” Afro Barometer, 
Working Paper No. 95 (Afro Barometer, March 2008), 1, 3-13. 
19 European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM), “Kenya Final Report: General Elections 27 December 
2007” (EU EOM, April 2008), 7-10; Mutua, 248. 
20 Mutua, 241. 
21 EU EOM, 19; Mutua, 242. 
22 International Republican Institute (IRI), “Kenya Presidential, Parliamentary and Local Elections December 27, 
2007: Election Observation Mission Final Report” (IRI, 2008), 14; Mutua, 243. 
23 EU EOM, 21, 25. 
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transparent.”24  Almost 9.9 million Kenyans voted on December 27 compared to only 5.9 million in 2002, 
representing a registered voter turnout of 69% compared to 58%.25  On December 30, however, after 
almost 3 days of tallying votes, and suspicious delays in reporting constituency returns, the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya (ECK) announced that President Kibaki had won re-election by a small margin.  In 
only a matter of minutes, President Kibaki was sworn in for his second term, and a few hours later ODM 
leadership declared the results invalid.  Citing the ODM’s clear victory in the parliamentary elections, 
Odinga refused to concede the presidency and demanded that Kibaki resign.26  International observers 
later reported that both sides had been guilty of falsifying constituency returns.  Furthermore, the 
supposedly impartial and independent ECK was found to have rigged the totals, resulting in 325,131 more 
votes being counted in the presidential poll than in the parliamentary and numerous discrepancies 
between constituency reports and announced results.  This fraud fueled charges that Kibaki controlled the 




The violence surrounding the 2007 general elections resulted in over 1,000 Kenyans killed and thousands 
more injured, as well as tens of thousands internally displaced.28  The violence occurred throughout the 
country, but began in largely ODM-supporting territory, such as Rift Valley Province, and was aimed at 
groups that did not support the opposition movement, mainly the Kikuyu.  The conflict later spread to 
PNU-dominated areas, especially Central Province, as the Kikuyu engaged in revenge killings.29  The 
KNCHR and the Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence (“Waki Report”) have published 
exhaustive accounts of the violence throughout Kenya, revealing some disturbing common themes. 
 
The suddenness of the eruption and systematic progression of violence in many areas suggests concerted 
planning and coordination.  In Nairobi, gangs used long-established logistics networks to lead much of 
the violence.  In one instance, a Luo businessman transported supplies of fuel and pangas (machetes) to 
local youths.  Coordination also occurred outside of Nairobi.  In one area of the Rift Valley, Kalenjin 
attackers destroyed homes that had not been systematically marked as belonging to their co-ethnics.  In 
many other areas, roadblocks were used to discriminate between allies and ethnic targets.30 
 
The financial support and incitement needed for this coordinated violence came from both local business 
leaders and politicians.  Some Kalenjin politicians, for example, referred to Kikuyu and Kisii residents of 
the Rift Valley as “madoadoa” (stains) during their campaigns.  In Nakuru town, former Members of 
Parliament (MP) held fund raising meetings for revenge attacks against the Luo, Kalenjin, and Luhya.31  
Perhaps most tragically, much of the violence was committed by Kenyan youths manipulated by 
                                                            
24 IRI, 28; EU EOM, 31. 
25 IRI, 7; David Throup, “Kibaki’s Triumph: The Kenyan General Election of December 2002,” Elections in Africa 
Series, Briefing Paper No. 3 (The Royal Institute of International Affairs: Africa Programme, June 2003), 5. 
26 IRI, 30; KNCHR, 23; Mutua, 247. 
27 IRI, 32-33; EU EOM, 15, 34; Ted Dagne, “Kenya: The December 2007 Elections and the Challenges Ahead” 
(Congressional Research Service, February 2008), 2-3. 
28 Figures corroborated by numerous sources, as well as raw conflict data used in analytical section. 
29 KNCHR, 19. 
30 Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence (“Waki Report”), Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Post-Election Violence in Kenya, (CIPEV, 2008), 68; KNCHR, 42-43, 59. 
31 KNCHR, 3, 5, 58, 87 
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community elders.  Youth gangs in Nairobi’s Kibera slum burned houses and shops and attacked their 
neighbors with pangas.  According to one NGO, youth planned only 7% of the violence, but committed 
55%.32 
 
The government response to the conflict was counterproductive, and an extensive record of police 
violence is testament to the disintegration of rule of law throughout the country.  The Independent 
Medico-Legal Unit conducted 80 post-mortem examinations during the conflict and found that 29% of the 
victims died from police gunshots.33  Unfortunately, this record is consistent with how Kenyan police 
forces have dealt with other security issues.  Despite evidence to the contrary, an internal inquiry into 
alleged police violations in the Mt. Elgon region in March concluded that “the security forces did not 
commit human rights violations.”34  United Nations (UN) investigator Philip Alston further documented 
such impunity for unlawful police killings in his examination of government-sponsored attempts to 
exterminate opposition gangs in Nairobi and Central Province.35 
 
Mediation and Power Sharing 
 
As the violence worsened in January, international pressure to end the standoff increased.  Beginning on 
January 28, ex-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan brought the PNU and ODM to the negotiating table.  
Progress was slow, as conflict continued to tear the country apart.  Throughout February, Annan engaged 
the leaders in talks, enlisting the aid of international dignitaries, including Nobel Laureate Desmond Tutu, 
several former East African presidents, current UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, and U.S. Secretary 
of State Condoleezza Rice.  Despite the attention, the parties did not reach a power sharing agreement 
until February 28. 
 
The accord created a coalition government in which Raila Odinga accepted the position of Prime Minister 
and President Kibaki yielded to him powers to “coordinate and supervise government affairs.”  Positions 
in the now vastly expanded Cabinet were also divided evenly between the PNU and ODM.36  While the 
agreement did end the worst of the conflict, localized violence continued to smolder in some parts of the 
country, and it appeared that the impact on the ground would be slow in developing.37  Furthermore, the 
hasty construction of the power-sharing agreement and its understandable short-term focus on ending the 
violence meant that it largely ignored the underlying causes of the conflict.  Since enactment, the 
arrangement has largely failed to check executive power or to alter public perceptions of the government, 
                                                            
32 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, “The Immediate and 
Underlying Causes and Consequences of Kenya’s Flawed Elections,” 110th Cong., 2nd sess. (February 2008), 53; 
World Bank, Kenya Poverty and Inequality Assessment: Executive Summary and Synthesis Report, Report No. 
44190-KE, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Africa Region (World Bank, April 2009), 10. 
33 KNCHR, 4; Independent Medico-Legal Unit (IMLU), “Forensic Investigations Into Post-Election Violence 
Related Deaths” (IMLU, February 2008), 5, 8. 
34 Scaver Mbogho, Kenya Police Report and Assessment of the Mt. Elgon Violence (October 2008), 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/6337563/Kenya-Police-Inquiry-into-the-Mt-Elgon-violence#about (accessed March 
7, 2010), 3, 45 
35 Philip Alston, “Press Statement by Prof. Philip Alston: UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Arbitrary or 
Summary Executions,” Mission to Kenya 16-25 February 2009, 2-3. 
36 KNCHR, 29-33. 
37 Brookings Institution, “Towards a Lasting Peace: Addressing the Political and Humanitarian Situation in Kenya,” 
The Brookings Institution – University of Bern, Project on Internal Displacement (March 2008), 2. 
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as each principal candidate has used the façade of political cooperation to cover his efforts to reinforce his 
respective ethnopolitical alliance for the next election.38 
 
 
Root Causes of the Conflict 
 
At his CSIS talk only a few months after signing the accord, Prime Minister Odinga warned of the danger 
of leaving underlying grievances about “land budgets, regional development disparities, and huge 
inequalities… simmering.”39  Merely freezing a conflict in place, without addressing the causes, risks 




As evident in the ineffective government response to the conflict, as well as police complicity, Kenyan 
society has been conditioned to accept political violence as standard practice around elections.  Leaders 
have not been held accountable for instigating unrest with hate speech, or for financing attacks.  District 
officers and chiefs that participated in the violence following the 1992 general elections, in fact, were 
rewarded with positions in the national government.40  As the Waki Report notes, 
 
The deliberate use of violence by politicians… plus the decision not to punish 
perpetrators… has led to a culture of impunity and a constant escalation of violence… 
which is now largely outside of the control of the State and its security agencies.  What 
this means in practice is that violence is widespread and can be tapped for a variety of 
reasons, including but not exclusively to win elections.41 
 
Institutional patterns of violence thus represent significant barriers to long-term peace.42  Even more 




Following independence in 1963, President Jomo Kenyatta led the weak Kenyan African National Union 
(KANU) as a moderator between two larger parties that opposed each other over the rights of the poor 
and landless versus those of the large farmers and business class.  To sustain this role, Kenyatta kept party 
and administrative affairs in separate spheres.  However, this political set-up was short-lived.  By the 
1970s, ethnic factions increasingly maneuvered to form dominant coalitions, undermining the importance 
of political compromise.  The distinction between party and administration faded, and Kenyatta regularly 
                                                            
38 Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL), “Kenya: Temporary Ceasefire or Lasting Peace?” Policy 
Brief 2009 (FCNL, September 2009), 3-4; Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “Practical 
Perspectives on Constitutional Reform in Kenya: A Conversation with Kenyan Members of Parliament” (CSIS 
Africa Program, February 12, 2010). 
39 Odinga, “Kenya: A Way Forward.” 
40 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political Violence and Kenya’s Crisis of 
Governance,” Volume 20, No. 1A (HRW, March 2008), 17-20. 
41 Waki Report, 22. 
42 Ibid., 22, 26-27. 
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used political offices as currency to buy support.  According to Jennifer Widner, “By 1989, half the 
members elected to Parliament occupied ministerial positions [in the administration].”43  In practice, the 
legislative branch ceased to function as a check on executive power and the imperial presidency was born. 
 
The concentration of executive power in Kenya’s winner-take-all electoral system caused the emergence 
of a zero-sum game between ethnic groups fighting for control of the state.  Furthermore, as KNCHR 
observes, “many Kenyans have come to view the ascendancy of ‘one of their own’ ethnic kin to the 
presidency as the best assurance of ‘benefiting’ as individuals and as communities.”44  The Waki Report 
describes this popular identification with the executive as the “personalization of power around the 
presidency,” essentially creating an ethnicized cult of personality around the figurehead and further 
undermining administration accountability.45 
 
Horizontal Inequity – Patronage, Resource Conflict, and Land Inequality 
 
The concentration of power in an ethnicized presidency has exacerbated Kenya’s already severe 
horizontal inequity, or the inequality of resources and power by group, as opposed to vertical inequality, 
which measures inequality by individual.  The roots of this system hearken back to the early days of 
independence when President Kenyatta favored his Kikuyu community in Central Province over other 
areas and used patronage rewards to solidify Kikuyu political unity and national dominance.  Jeni 
Klugman describes this early Kenyan development in stark terms as “Kikuyuization.”46  As the World 
Bank’s Poverty and Inequality Assessment for Kenya notes, although the political balance would shift 
after Kenyatta’s death, this early practice established the trend wherein “the distribution of public goods 
such as education facilities, health, water and physical infrastructure… follow patterns of access to 
political power.”47  This held true during the rule of Kenyatta’s successor, Daniel arap Moi, who reversed 
existing patterns of ethnic patronage by excluding Kikuyu businesses from investment opportunities and 
transferring control over 40 of 85 profitable state-owned enterprises to his Kalenjin co-ethnics.48 
 
Such patronage has fostered egregious corruption in Kenyan politics and society, from election fixing and 
pursuing public office for personal gain, to extensive bribery and financial scandals, but perhaps the most 
detrimental aspect has been the entrenchment of ethnic-based horizontal inequity that favors whichever 
ethnic group dominates the presidency.49  Elected by constituencies that coincide with tribal boundaries, 
Kenya’s patron-client system polarizes competition for resources, already a common driver of conflict, 
along ethnic lines.50  According to Bratton and Kimenyi’s polling, 25% of Kenyans have experienced 
ethnic discrimination, and the perception among disempowered ethnopolitical groups is that “ethnic 
                                                            
43 Jennifer Widner, The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya: From “Harambee!” to “Nyayo!” (Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1992), 31-33. 
44 KNCHR, 18; Gettleman, “Signs in Kenya of a Land Redrawn by Ethnicity.” 
45 Waki Report, 23. 
46 Klugman, 300. 
47 World Bank, Kenya Poverty and Inequality Assessment, 8-9. 
48 Klugman, 313. 
49 KNCHR, 21; Klugman, 319; World Bank, Kenya Poverty and Inequality Assessment, 127-131. 
50 John Oucho, Undercurrents of Ethnic Conflict in Kenya (Boston: Brill, 2002), 44; Angelique Haugerud, The 
Culture of Politics in Modern Kenya (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 46; Jennifer DeMaio, 
Confronting Ethnic Conflict: The Role of Third Parties in Managing Africa’s Civil Wars (New York: Lexington 
Books, 2009), 29; Branko Milanovic, “Is Inequality in Africa Really Different?” (World Bank, May 2003), 34. 
11 
 
favoritism is the rule.”51  This horizontal inequity has tangible implications for the construction of roads 
and physical infrastructure and the allocation of funding for health and education.52  Alwiya Alwy and 
Susanne Schech’s study of access to education in Kenya finds that there is severe geographical inequity, 
epitomized by the complete absence of state secondary schools in Coast and Northeastern provinces.53  In 
a recent visit to Washington, Kenyan MPs from the Parliamentary Reform Caucus echoed this finding.  
One claimed, “Only the area that the president comes from gets the lion’s share of resources.”  Another 
highlighted, “Almost 80% of the country can call itself marginalized” based on resource allocation.54  
Ultimately, as the Nairobi Star asserted in March 2008, the reality is that “for any tribe, ‘being in 
opposition’ (as opposed to ‘being in government’) is a fate dreaded as guaranteeing continued poverty.”55 
 
Despite the harmful effects of corruption, patronage, and ethnic conflict over state and natural resources, 
horizontal inequity in land distribution supersedes all.  As Klugman asserts, “Land is the most manifest 
dimension of unequal access to resources.”56  This is evident in inequality indices.  While Kenya’s Gini 
Index is 45.2,57 representing moderately high inequality (U.S. Gini is 40.8), its Gini index isolating land 
inequality is a staggering 83.2 (landless population included), a value that represents extreme inequality.  




Exacerbating conflict over this inequity is the fact that, according to the Ndung’u Report, “Land [is] a 
focal point in Kenya’s history….  It has traditionally dictated the pulse of… nationhood.”59 
                                                            
51 Bratton and Kimenyi, 6-7. 
52 Michael Chege, “Weighed Down by Old Ethnic Baggage, Kenya Races to Another Historic Election,” Africa 
Policy Forum, 06/22/2007, http://csis.org/blog/weighed-down-old-ethnic-baggage-kenya-races-another-historic-
election (accessed March 9, 2010). 
53 Alwiya Alwy and Susanne Schech, “Ethnic Inequalities in Education in Kenya,” International Education Journal 
5, no. 2 (2004), 267-272. 
54 CSIS, “Practical Perspectives on Constitutional Reform in Kenya.” 
55 “Why Kenya Went Up in Flames,” Nairobi Star, 03/06/2008. 
56 Klugman, 304. 
57 The Gini Index is a widely used indicator of economic inequality that measures economic power concentration in 
a given population, from 0 for perfect equality to 100 for perfect inequality. 
58 World Bank, Kenya Poverty and Inequality Assessment, 18, 102-104. 




Similar to other inequities, this contention has broken along ethnic lines.  As KNCHR notes, “clan 
membership [has] remained the only means the poor people… [have to] access land.”60  European 
colonizers upset the traditional system of communal land ownership by parceling farm tracts—most 
significantly, pushing the Kalenjin off of the best farming land in the Rift Valley.  At independence, land 
was then sold on a “willing buyer-willing seller” basis.  Though fair by European standards, this free 
market system heavily favored the Kikuyu.  As Mwangi Kimenyi and Njuguna Ndung’u argue, the 
Kikuyu embraced capitalism before other tribes, and were thus better positioned to raise capital and form 
cooperatives.  Land was also used to appease the Kikuyu Mau Mau rebels.  The Kikuyu thus acquired 
large tracts of land from the departing Europeans, especially ex-Kalenjin property in the Rift Valley.61 
 
This land transfer fostered deep resentment among rival ethnic groups, especially the Kalenjin, who 
viewed the Kikuyu as settling on their ancestral land.  Land grievances thus became a key component of 
ethnopolitical competition.  President Moi attempted to marginalize smallholder Kikuyu in order to 
redistribute their land to political allies.  Such efforts turned violent in the 1990s, as the Kalenjin and 
other ethnopolitical groups attempted to forcibly evict the Kikuyu from their land.62  Frustration over 
persistent land conflict figured prominently in President Kibaki’s initial rise to power in 2002, as he made 
land reform a key plank of his campaign platform in an attempt to sway the opposition.  After being 
elected, President Kibaki launched the Ndung’u Commission to investigate land inequality and 
corruption.  Although the final report focused on corruption more than land distribution, it did present 
some useful recommendations, such as establishing a land titles tribunal and a land commission, which 
President Kibaki largely ignored as being too controversial.63 
 
During the 2007 general elections, the KNCHR observed that “violence became a strategy for remedying 
political and resource grievances which the electoral process… [was] unable to resolve.” Such grievances, 
based on persistent horizontal inequities in land, education, jobs, and political power, stem from long-
standing traditions of patronage, corruption, and resource distribution policies.64  Intuitively, these sources 
of tension appear to drive conflict throughout Kenya.  However, a systematic examination of local data is 
required to empirically test the impact of these underlying grievances during the 2007-08 violence. 
 
 
Quantitative Analysis of Election-Related Violence 
 
Although an extensive literature on economic inequality and conflict exists, the vast majority of the 
studies utilize a macro-level approach, reporting contradictory results and debating the general validity of 
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60 KNCHR, 18. 
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inequality as a determinant of civil conflict.65  Macro-level examinations, however, miss the local 
dynamics that influence the emergence of violence.  As a recent analysis by Lars-Erik Cederman et al. 
notes, “The grievance hypothesis [economic inequity] has not been tested with adequate data; rather, it 
has been tested with highly aggregated proxies that do not provide a direct measure of political inequality 
along ethnic lines.”  The study goes on to argue that marginalized groups will use violence to remedy 
such inequity, especially in countries where “the central state is all-decisive.”66  While this finding does 
support the grievance narrative in Kenya, its omission of local dynamics leaves it open to critique. 
 
Quantitative analyses that do explore such local dynamics of civil violence are atypical in the global 
conflict literature, largely due to a scarcity of reliable micro-level data.  However, studies conducted by 
Stathis Kalyvas and Tim Gulden of conflicts in Greece and Guatemala, respectively, provide some useful 
insights into micro-level determinants.  Kalyvas finds that violence during the Greek Civil War (1943-
1949) increased significantly in areas where a single ideological group was dominant but lacked complete 
control, and declined “in areas of parity.”67  Gulden finds strikingly similar results in his analysis of the 
Guatemalan Civil War (1977-1986), where a nonlinear relationship emerged between ethnic demography 
and killing.  Again, violence increased significantly in towns dominated by a single ethnic group that 
lacked complete control, and minimal levels of violence occurred around the 50% split due to the 
mitigating effects of ethnic balance.68  While examining different aspects of conflict and focusing on 
ethnopolitical demographics instead of inequity, both studies reveal the importance of local dynamics. 
 
The few micro-level studies that explore economic inequity reinforce the importance of local dynamics.  
Klaus Deininger’s work on violence in Uganda (1992-1999) finds that “physical attacks are estimated to 
increase with levels of… wealth inequality,” implying that inequity becomes more significant as violence 
becomes more localized, down to individual physical attacks.69  E. Wayne Nafziger and Juha Auvinen 
find similar evidence in conflicts in Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, and Mexico.  They conclude, “The 
risk of political disintegration increases with a surge of income disparities by class, region, and 
community, especially when these disparities lack legitimacy among the population.”70 
 
Frances Stewart’s paper, “Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities,” provides a theoretical 
foundation for local examinations of ethnic relations and economic inequity.  He argues, “The prime 
cause of conflict arises from inequalities among groups….  What is needed for… analysis is a horizontal 
                                                            
65 See Michael Kniss, “Intertwined Inequities: Micro-Level Economic Determinants of Civil Conflict” (Center for 
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measurement of inequality between groups, defined by region/ethnicity/class/religion, according to the 
most appropriate type of group identification in the particular society.”71  Havard Hegre et al. concur in a 
disaggregated study of conflict in Liberia, “Conflicts are often local.  Country-level measures of average 
horizontal inequality… may fail to capture the relevant groups or the relevant dimension of inequality.”72  
Building on these theoretical and methodological bases, a multivariate regression analysis of local 
violence emerging around Kenya’s 2007-08 general elections can be used to examine the relevance of 
certain underlying grievances.  This empirical foundation will further enable the effective prioritization of 




Pulling news accounts from Kenyan print and online media outlets, Kevin Jones and Steven Silverstein at 
Georgetown University have compiled an impressive dataset of incidents of physical violence73 occurring 
throughout Kenya before and after the 2007 general elections.74  Although the data contains entries as far 
back as April 2007, only incidents occurring after September 1 are included in this analysis.  Odinga 
received the ODM presidential nomination on September 1, and the PNU coalesced officially on 
September 16.75  Furthermore, examining the incident descriptions clearly shows that election-related 
violence began emerging only after September 1.  Certain criminal incidents during the relevant time 
period are also identifiable as non-politically motivated, such as “cattle rustling,” and are thus excluded.76  
The dataset analyzed was thus comprised of 234 incidents of physical violence with 3,520 victims killed 
or wounded between September 1, 2007 and January 31, 2008.  Geographic locations for most incidents 
were exact enough to manually code their corresponding constituencies.77 
 
Ideally, household survey data would be used to detail socioeconomic and polling data by geographic 
location.  Unfortunately, the data from Kenyan household surveys is not publicly available.  As such, 
constituency-level indicators were extracted from various Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics sources, as 
well as the Electoral Commission of Kenya.78  This representative data was then merged with the conflict 
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dataset to conduct regression analysis.  As previously noted, quantitative analysis of the local conflict data 
can reveal what micro-level factors drove the election-related violence and continue to represent security 
threats.  Although a comprehensive evaluation of horizontal inequity requires household survey data that 
identifies inequality by ethnic group, analysis of the separate components can offer meaningful 
approximations.  The multivariate regression used in this analysis thus tests a dependent variable 
measuring violence (in casualties) against independent variables measuring ethnic demography and 




The regression begins by testing the effects of ethnic demography.  According to the studies by Gulden 
and Kalyvas, levels of violence should be lower in areas where ethnopolitical opponents are in relatively 
equal numbers.79  A further examination of the Guatemala data shows that violence increases dramatically 
in a bi-modal fashion when one ethnopolitical group is 70-95% concentrated in an area.80  Kenyan ethnic 
data is only available at the district level from 1989,81 and is thus outdated and overly aggregated.  
However, the polling results from the 2007 elections serve as a suitable (and current) proxy for ethnic 
demography.82  In fact, vote data is likely a better measure than outdated and overly aggregated census 
counts due to the ethnic homogeneity of Kenyan political alliances.  Vote percentages for the two 
principal parties were thus compared to test the effects of ethnic demography on the violence in Kenya.  




Housing Census: Volume I” (CBS, January 2001, published); Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), “1999 
Population and Housing Census: Volume II” (CBS, January 2001, published); Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS), “Welfare Monitoring Survey II, 1994: Basic Report” (CBS, May 1996, published), 135-139, 170-171; 
ECK, “Kenya: ECK Official Election Results.” 
79 Kalyvas, 288-289; Gulden, 3-7. 
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(December 2008), unpublished ms. 
81 The 1989 Kenyan census was the last to release data on ethnic distribution throughout the country.  See “Kenya 
Holds First Census In A Decade, Causes Outcry Over Ethnic Identity,” The Huffington Post, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/08/25/kenya-holds-first-census_n_268076.html (accessed March 13, 2010). 
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While violence in Kenya is lower when ethnic concentrations are relatively equal, controlling for 
population, corroborating both Gulden’s and Kalyvas’ findings,83 Figure 2 reveals that unlike both, 
ethnopolitical demography is unable to explain overall levels of violence in Kenya.84  This suggestion is 
tested in the multivariate regression with variables structured to measure the percentage point difference 
between ethnic alliances in a constituency, as well as the square of this term to test for the bimodal 
relationship found in Guatemala.  A dummy variable for relative balance is also included where the ethnic 
alliances comprise 45-55% of the local population. 
 
As an alternative to the seemingly insufficient ethnopolitical landscape, testing economic inequity 
indicators may offer a more complete explanation of the outbreak of violence.  In its 2007 report, 
Geographic Dimensions of Well-Being in Kenya, the Central Bureau of Statistics details rural and urban 
Gini values by constituency.  Although the data come from the “1997 Welfare Monitoring Survey,” the 
Gini values represent reasonably current indicators of local economic inequality in Kenya.85  The urban 
Gini index for constituencies was used in this analysis, as it was more relevant than the rural index to the 
outbreak of conflict.  Violence would most likely have occurred in the urban epicenters of the 
constituencies, as that is where the local population would have regularly encountered people from 
opposing ethnopolitical groups.  Inequality is also felt more acutely in urban areas, as people reside in 
closer proximity and thus have a heightened awareness of their socioeconomic status.  A different 
measure of inequity that more fully captures rural grievances was included elsewhere in the regression. 
 
Of the 210 constituencies in Kenya, 32 had an urban Gini value of zero because they had no urban 
population within their borders.  Although the Gini values of zero imply perfect urban equality, this does 
not present a problem of empirics, but rather one of scale.  If no urban center exists, violence should be 
lower due to the lack of a geographic focal point for violence and lower perceived inequality.  
Furthermore, if no urban center exists, a constituency’s inequality indicator should be weighted to its rural 
measure, which is captured elsewhere.  However, the difference in scale between the constituencies with 
and without urban populations is too great.  Thus, the regression employs an indexed version of the urban 
Gini, coding all constituencies that have an urban population of less than 1,000 as having a Gini of 24, or 
one point less than the minimum qualifying Gini.  This indexing minimizes the impact of Gini values that 
are based on insubstantial urban population, but still captures the importance of urban inequality as 
representative of constituency-level perceived inequity and geographic opportunity for violence. 
 
Rural inequity in Kenya is embodied in unbalanced land allocation.  Kenya’s 1994 “Welfare Monitoring 
Survey II: Basic Report” details the distribution of households by landholding at the district level.  
Assuming that district figures are a fair representation of constituency-level perceptions, the imbalance 
between large farmholdings and landlessness can be used to create an index of land inequity.  According 
to the report, the national mean holding size was 2.59 hectares and 59% of Kenyan households held 
between 0.01 and 2.99 hectares of land.86  As such, holdings of greater than 3 hectares were considered 
“large farmholdings” in this analysis.  Districts were coded on separate 1-5 scales based on their 
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percentile locations for both large farmholdings and landlessness.87  These two scales were then combined 
to create an index of perceived land inequity, ranging from 1=egregious inequity to 5=mild inequity, with 
3 being the overall national average for Kenya.  Constituencies took on the index values of their 
corresponding districts.88  Land inequity was then tested in the regression analysis as a series of dummy 
variables compared against the national average.  Using GIS software, Figure 3 maps land inequity 




Figure 3 reveals that violence was more prevalent in areas where land inequity was starkest, especially the 
areas of more egregious land inequity located in Rift Valley Province.  Perhaps surprisingly, Lamu 
District in Coast Province has egregious land inequity, but suffered no violence.  Of the two 
constituencies comprising Lamu District, one is the smallest in Kenya and houses no urban population, 
but the other, while small, is not insignificant.  This suggests that factors other than land inequity may be 
responsible for the outbreak of violence.  As such, the regression also controls for constituency 
populations and poverty rates (as of 1999), and includes a dummy variable indicating if the constituency 
was part of a large city (defined as having an urban population greater than 50,000).  Finally, provincial 
dummy variables were included to control for regional characteristics not captured by the principal 
variables.89 
                                                            
87 Uneven quantile splits were used in order to highlight differentiation between extreme land inequity and the 
national average.  Percentiles 0-15, 15-35, 35-65, 65-85, 85-100 yielded coding of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. 
88 Provincial level percentages were used in cases where district land distribution data was missing. 
89 Unemployment levels might seemingly offer a better measure of absolute economic levels, but according to 
discussion present in Kenya’s 1999 census, Kenyan unemployment figures are chronically under-estimated.  The 
unreliability of the data is largely the result of people who should be counted as unemployed reporting 





The statistical model performs well as an analysis of the impact of economic inequality on the severity of 
civil violence and further offers important suggestions about the impact of horizontal inequity.  Table 3 
summarizes the results of the multivariate regression in six iterations to present the consistency of the 




Although two of the three measures of ethnopolitical distribution emerge as significant in model 1, the 
strength of each as predictors of violence erodes steadily as more control variables are added to the 
regression.  Both terms already lose significance at even the 10% level when provincial controls are 
included in model 2.  This suggests that the early significance of ethnopolitical distribution is being 
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captured elsewhere in the regression, perhaps either in the controlled provincial characteristics, or in the 
independent variables testing economic inequity. 
 
While the sign and magnitude of the coefficients on population unsurprisingly indicate that as population 
increases substantially, violence will increase slightly, the control variable has weak explanatory power.  
The city indicator is far more important, emerging as significant at the 5% level in each model that 
contains provincial controls.  This reveals that constituencies within large cities are far more likely to 
experience increased violence by about an estimated 30 casualties.  This result reinforces the belief that 
urban centers are more vulnerable to violence, as they are places where diverse groups encounter each 
other and inequity is felt more intensely.  The urban Gini index further corroborates this finding.  
Significant at the 10% level in models that include provincial controls, the coefficients estimate that for 
every 2-point increase in a constituency’s urban Gini coefficient, an additional casualty will occur.  
Though this increase in casualties is minimal, it still contributes to overall vulnerability to violence, even 
after accounting for rural inequity as measured by land distribution. 
 
Highly significant at the 1% level, land inequity emerges as the dominant finding in the analysis.  
Egregious land inequity (e.g., the district percentages of both landless population and large farmholdings 
are in the top 15th percentile nationwide) estimates an increase of roughly 73 casualties against 
constituencies with land inequity comparable to the national average.  The next step down, or critical land 
inequity (e.g., the district percentage of either landless population or large farmholdings is in the top 15th 
percentile nationwide with the opposite not in the lowest 15th percentile), similarly estimates an increase 
of roughly 24 casualties against constituencies with land inequity comparable to the national average.  
Furthermore, while not quite significant at the 10% level, the coefficient on mild land inequity (e.g., the 
district percentages of both landless population and large farm holdings are in the bottom 15th percentile 
nationwide) estimates a decrease in violence by roughly 4 casualties against constituencies with land 
inequity comparable to the national average.91  Land inequity thus emerges as a strong predictor of 
violence and equality as a suggested negative predictor. 
 
The coefficients on the poverty control variable further reinforce the importance of inequity as a relational 
concept.  The significance of a constituency’s poverty rate is inconsistent and dependent on the inclusion 
of provincial controls.  However, the coefficients estimate, perhaps counter-intuitively, that violence 
decreases as poverty increases, or that wealthier constituencies experience more violence.  This result 
perhaps suggests that the presence of substantial wealth in an area exacerbates perceptions of inequity 
among the poor population. 
 
The overall explanatory power of the regression, expressed in its R2 value of 0.35 (model 5), is relatively 
robust when compared to other related analyses of civil conflict.  Various analyses by Ted Gurr on 
ethnopolitical conflict have yielded R2 values ranging from 0.05 to 0.41.  Similarly, Kalyvas’ examination 
of the Greek Civil War resulted in R2 values ranging from 0.27 to 0.54, and an extension of Gulden’s 
work on Guatemala yielded R2 values ranging from 0.12 to 0.41.92  As a further robustness check, model 
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6 tests ethnicity data from the 1989 census, as opposed to the 2007 vote returns.  Although the ethnicity 
data is outdated and only available at the district level (thereby decreasing the number of observations to 
70), the high significance of the land inequity variables remains consistent.  Certain implications can be 




The regression results show that ethnic demography is insufficient to explain the outbreak of violence 
surrounding the 2007 elections.  Alternatively, the economic inequity variables emerge as highly 
significant.  However, it is quite possible that the inequity indicators are in fact capturing an ethnic 
demography component.  Although it is impossible to prove conclusively without household survey data 
detailing ethnicity, land inequity is likely an effective proxy for horizontal inequity, especially when 
controlling for provincial characteristics.  For instance, two province dummy variables emerged as 
especially significant when compared against the others.  Rift Valley and Coast provinces consistently 
estimated higher and lower levels of violence, respectively, suggesting that some uncontrolled-for 
characteristic makes them especially more or less likely to experience violence. 
 
As previously discussed, the Kikuyu benefitted disproportionately from post-colonial land sales in the 
Rift Valley, which the majority Kalenjin population views as an unjust acquisition of their own tribal 
land.  However, inequity in Coast Province is not drawn along the ethnic cleavages that were most 
relevant during the 2007-08 conflict.  Dominated by the Mijikenda, Coast Province has only small 
populations of Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luo, and Luhya.  Thus, the victory of the Kikuyu candidate over the 
Luo/Luhya/Kalenjin opposition coalition did not represent as great a defeat for the local populations in 
that region as elsewhere.  Intuitively and empirically, violence occurred at lower levels in these areas, 
even where horizontal inequity was more severe.  Recalling Figure 3, the severe inequity in parts of Coast 
Province may signify a future risk of violence, such as that experienced elsewhere in Kenya in 2007-08.  
According to the International Crisis Group, Mijikenda militias have begun forming out of frustration that 
the wealth from coastal tourism has been funneled into the hands of “Kikuyu middlemen.”  If the already 
severe inequity in parts of Coast Province is increasingly identified with salient ethnic cleavages, and if 
the local landless population perceives economic opportunity in the tourism industry as diminishing, these 
areas might be the next to explode into mass conflict.93 
 
 
Qualitative Corroboration of Quantitative Findings 
 
The lack of precise household-level data prevents irrefutable conclusions, but the statistical analysis 
clearly suggests that horizontal inequity is the primary cause of civil violence in Kenya.  Personal 
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Perceived Inequity in Nairobi’s Slums 
 
Perceived inequity in Nairobi’s slums spurred intense violence during the 2007-08 conflict.  Reflecting on 
a visit to Nairobi during a February 2008 congressional hearing on the Kenyan crisis, Representative 
Donald Payne highlighted this effect in Nairobi’s Kibera neighborhood, one of the largest urban slums in 
Africa.  “This inequity, this dollar a day when you have such affluence in other parts, I am sure that… 
added to the tension in… Kibera.”94  The slum’s proximity to Nairobi’s burgeoning business communities 
and wealthy residential sections exacerbate perceptions of poor living conditions.  According to an 
inventory of Nairobi’s slums, Kibera is located in the same electoral constituency as the Karen and 
Langata neighborhoods, “some of the most affluent suburbs in Nairobi.”95  During the 2007-08 conflict, 
these poor areas experienced severe violence, as frustration over such inequities transformed into what the 
African Population and Health Research Center described as “ethnic animosity.”96 
 
The horizontal nature of economic splits within Kibera, and other similar Nairobi neighborhoods, is also 
destructive.  As the Waki Report notes, many slums “are now informally divided into ethnically 
homogeneous zones.”97  Many landlords discriminate along ethnic lines when choosing tenants and most 
are “absentee,” living in other parts of Nairobi.  As such, they have few incentives to invest in the 
housing, or improve the local infrastructure, especially since they have imposed strong barriers to entry, 
based on class and ethnicity; over 90% of the landlords in Nairobi’s Mathare North neighborhood are 
Kikuyu.  Furthermore, landlords have little contact with residents, as they employ agents to collect rents, 
and most rental contracts are merely verbal agreements.  Half of rental households are thus vulnerable to 
arbitrary eviction.98  KNCHR interviews from Kibera reveal how these horizontal divisions sparked local 
conflict: 
 
Once the violence broke out, tenants from some ethnic communities forcibly evicted 
landlords and… tenants from other communities and took over the houses, and… started 
charging reduced rents….  This situation precipitated another round of violence as the 
owners hired [ethnic] gangs to reclaim their property.99 
 
KNCHR estimates that 5,000 people in Kibera alone were displaced in this cyclical violence aimed at the 
tangible symbols of horizontal inequity in Nairobi’s poor neighborhoods.100 
 
                                                            
94 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, “The Political 
Crisis in Kenya: A Call for Justice and Peaceful Resolution,” 110th Cong., 2nd sess. (February 2008), 26. 
95 Pamoja Trust, An Inventory of the Slums in Nairobi [Draft] (Pamoja Trust, 2008), 
http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/nairobi_inventory.pdf (accessed March 13, 2010), 93; Pamoja Trust, An Inventory 
of the Slums in Nairobi (Pamoja Trust, April 2009) http://www.homeless-
international.org/client_files/doc_docs/repNairobiSlumInventory_Final_Apr09.pdf (accessed March 13, 2010), 
59. 
96 African Population and Health Research Center (APHRC), “Poor People Bore the Brunt of Post-Election Violence 
in Kenya” (APHRC, January 2008). 
97 Waki Report, 31. 
98 World Bank, Kenya Inside Informality: Poverty, Jobs, Housing and Services in Nairobi’s Slums, Report No. 
36347-KE, Water and Urban Unit 1, Africa Region (World Bank, May 2006), 34-37; KNCHR, 40-42. 
99 KNCHR, 41. 





Personal accounts of the conflict from outside of Nairobi similarly reveal the impact of horizontal 
inequities on the emergence of violence.  In Eldoret, a meeting was held at the Assis Hotel on December 
1, more than 3 weeks before the elections, to prepare the community for war.  According to KNCHR, at 
this meeting, elders decided “that all lands belonging to the Kikuyu [would] become communal land after 
eviction.”  One victim recalled to the Waki Commission the result of a similar campaign in the Rift 
Valley.  “The Kalenjin were outside the house.  They taunted us and told us goodbye.  They told us that 
our magnificent house was theirs now….  I recognized some of them as the sons of our neighbor.”101   
 
The eviction of farmers coincides with previous findings, but this was not the only instance of economic 
targeting.  Violence was commonly directed at commercial symbols.  Ethnic-owned businesses were 
vandalized and destroyed in many areas of Kenya, including Makutano, Molo, Kuresoi, and Nakuru, 
where youths threw stones at the urging of an MP.  In Tinderet, Kikuyu workers were attacked while on 
the job at a tea factory.  In Naivasha, the Kikuyu took revenge on the Luo by forcing youth to burn 
businesses belonging to ODM supporters.  The youths also attacked Luo workers on a Kabati agricultural 
estate, and as KNCHR reports, “forcefully circumcised them before brutally hacking them to death.”  The 
tragic accounts of the violence distract from the distinctly economic objectives of the perpetrators.  
However, such targeted economic destruction had not occurred during past outbreaks of election violence 
in Kenya.102 
 
The admitted motivations of the perpetrators of violence leave little doubt that frustration over persistent 
horizontal inequities was at the heart of their actions.  As one Kalenjin youth from Kiambaa proclaimed, 
“We want to send a very strong message to Kibaki.  Because we cannot get him, we are going to work on 
his ethnic group, the Kikuyu.”103  In conjunction with the statistical findings, these clear accounts of 
economics-driven violence demand that responses work to redress the underlying sources of such deeply 
felt horizontal inequity. 
 
 
Ongoing U.S. Efforts in Kenya 
 
U.S. and international mediation efforts were vital to ending the 2007-08 conflict in Kenya.  In addition to 
the leadership of Kofi Annan, a visit by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and public pressure from 
President Bush, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Fraser met with Kibaki and 
Odinga to urge mediation.104  Despite this attention, international involvement in Kenya has tended to be 
temporary, most often focusing on emergency humanitarian assistance.  During the ethnic violence of the 
early 1990s, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) recommended a series of policy 
adjustments that focused on relief instead of long-term social and political reform.  According to 
congressional testimony by a USAID Deputy Assistant Administrator in February 2008, the United States 
has not done much better.  “When it comes to emergency assistance to Kenya… the focus has historically 
                                                            
101 KNCHR, 70; Waki Report, 137. 
102 KNCHR, 69, 76, 81, 86. 
103 KNCHR, 67. 
104 KNCHR, 28. 
23 
 
been on short-term response to incidents of drought and floods, as well as episodes of civil unrest.”  As a 
key regional U.S. ally, Kenya remains a major recipient of foreign assistance aimed at fostering good 
governance, economic development, education, health care, and rural income generation.  However, as 
evident by the outbreak of violence in 2007-08, such foreign assistance efforts have been ineffective at 
stanching Kenya’s cyclical patterns of civil conflict.105 
 
The 2011 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (CBJ) highlights how U.S. foreign 
assistance is attempting to address the underlying causes of conflict in Kenya: “The program focuses on 
health and advancing key political and governance reforms, including fighting corruption and impunity, 
which are needed to address the root causes of the 2007-08 post-election violence.”  Despite this 
recognition, programming requests do not align effectively with the stated justification.  Excluding global 
health funds, which are largely tied up in presidential initiatives and represent 86% of the budget, the FY 
2011 request totaled $98 million.  Although this figure represents a 12% increase over the FY 2010 
request, this financial commitment is insufficient to address the underlying causes of civil conflict in 
Kenya.106 
 
Examining individual programs reveals further prioritization weaknesses.  Funding requests for 
democratic development programs grew 35% between FY 2010 and FY 2011.  This increased support is 
critical for reducing the tendency of elections to be flashpoints of conflict.  While this emphasis on 
political reform addresses the three goals cited in the budget justification, namely governance, corruption, 
and impunity, it overlooks the centrality of horizontal inequity.  Even more worrisome are “peace and 
security” program priorities.  Although the total request for this category remained constant from FY 
2010 to FY 2011, the line item for “conflict mitigation and reconciliation” was zeroed out.  In FY 2011, 
the category consists solely of security sector reform and counterterrorism.  The request justification 
suggests that conflict mitigation efforts have been folded into continuing programs, but identifies internal 
instability as more of a distraction from counterterror efforts than as a primary focus.  “Post-election 
violence, ongoing chronic insecurity in several regions, and significant refugee flows from Somalia place 
competing demands on Kenya’s national security resources, and on Kenya’s ability to focus on specific 
counterterrorism initiatives.”107 
 
Although the justification is likely a product of the continuing counterterrorism-heavy U.S. political 
environment, this rationalization risks having conflict mitigation programs subsumed completely by this 
overarching mandate.  During congressional testimony in 2008, a USAID representative described efforts 
aimed at incorporating marginalized areas in northeastern Kenya into national peace-building as 
concentrating more on border security and preventing the influx of Islamic extremists from Somalia, than 
on local reconciliation.  The testimony continued, “Our ongoing conflict prevention and mitigation 
program, as currently designed, is not the right vehicle to respond to the conflict related to the political 
crisis.”  A fellow panelist echoed the sentiment.  “My sense is that we devote all our counterterror efforts 
to… the Kenyan Coast, and here we have this other, very real threat to Kenyan society and… we pay 
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insufficient attention to it.”108  Failing to devote enough attention and resources to conflict mitigation 
leaves Kenya ill prepared to face the potential resurgence of grievance-driven violence. 
 
U.S. economic development has similarly proven ineffective at alleviating horizontal inequity and thus 
addressing the underlying causes of conflict in Kenya.  Although the FY 2011 CBJ highlights the need to 
promote “equitable economic growth,” the vast majority of economic development funding goes to the 
agricultural sector (85% of the non-environmental protection FY 2011 request).  The FY 2010 CBJ 
similarly emphasized enhancing “the productivity and competitiveness of key agricultural commodities… 
linking the rural poor to growing markets.”109  Although supporting agricultural development seems a 
worthy goal, especially given the dominance of agriculture in Kenya’s economy, it will likely worsen the 
economic gap between landholding and landless populations, already a source of ethnic conflict.  
Furthermore, funding for programs to improve Kenyan private sector competitiveness and broad 
economic opportunities have been consistently under-prioritized, representing only 15% and 9% of the 
non-environmental protection FY 2011 and FY 2010 requests, respectively.110  Unfortunately, this 
programming likely has the greatest potential to ease horizontal inequity by providing investment and 
employment opportunities for landless and unemployed Kenyans. 
 
 
Evaluating Options for Future U.S. Action 
 
Kenya is ultimately responsible for preventing a rekindling of widespread domestic civil conflict.  
However, the United States can contribute significantly to the effort by realigning its assistance and 
program priorities with its stated foreign policy objectives, and by reducing horizontal inequity within 
Kenya at the local level.  Jennifer DeMaio’s review of third party intervention in African civil wars, 
Confronting Ethnic Conflict, presents a useful rubric for assessing policy options.  Recognizing that 
“external actors are not likely to be able to address all the underlying causes of the conflict,” she focuses 
on “conflict management,” or whether “violence is prevented from breaking out or from escalating.”  She 
then suggests four criteria to evaluate success: (1) sustaining the cessation of violence, (2) reducing 
human suffering, (3) limiting regional spillover effects of the conflict, and (4) promoting stable 
governance.111  Recognizing that the first two measures are preeminent, especially in the long run, as their 
failure precludes the remaining criteria, this rubric is applicable to conflict management options in Kenya. 
 
Short-Term Options for Conflict Prevention 
 
Many of the short-term U.S. policy options that surfaced during, and immediately after, the 2007-08 
election conflict focused on accountability.  International election observers offered a plethora of 
recommendations for improving the fairness of the electoral process, including ensuring the independence 
of the ECK, better monitoring and regulation of media coverage, and the consolidation of electoral law 
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and codes of conduct into one Elections Act.112  While U.S. electoral best practices are quite applicable to 
Kenya, the election process was not the primary cause of the conflict.  The election processing and vote 
manipulation did serve as triggers for the violence, but polling generally went smoothly.  Kenyans need to 
have confidence in their electoral system in order to accept election outcomes.  However, structures to 
validate votes and monitor elections already exist—though they might benefit from increased external 
support.  As such, while tangentially aimed at promoting stable governance, reforming the electoral 
process does not directly fulfill any of DeMaio’s four requirements for third-party involvement. 
 
Process-related condemnation should rather be directed at politicians who incited their constituents to 
violence with hate speech and calls for vengeance against opponents who stole the election.  To this end, 
concerned groups have offered numerous proposals, including prohibiting politicians guilty of inciting 
conflict from being appointed to cabinet positions, making campaign hate speech illegal, improving 
police vetting, and more aggressively trying police and government officials who committed acts of 
violence.  More applicable to the United States are recommendations stipulating that future foreign 
assistance be conditional on holding perpetrators accountable, or imposing targeted sanctions on the 
instigators of violence, including asset freezes and visa bans.113  Cutting off foreign assistance is 
undesirable, as U.S. funding is vital to Kenyan development.  Financially punishing those responsible for 
the conflict, however, may offer disincentives for repeating their actions in the next election.  Although 
Kenya is already over two years removed from the election, it is not too late to prosecute the perpetrators.  
Examples need to be made of those who incited the bloodshed to begin to challenge decades of impunity 
for political violence.  Furthermore, the same perpetrators from 2007-08 are those most likely to instigate 
conflict in the future.114  As such, shaping this effort proactively, as well as reactively, is critical.  In the 
run up to the 2012 general elections, the United States could announce its intention to sanction 
misconduct, and follow up by assisting with rigorous monitoring and investigation, as well as by 
mustering global support and partners.  Financial sanctions support DeMaio’s most important 
precondition, sustaining the cessation of violence, by weakening the institutionalized political violence 
structures that have been built on historical impunity. 
 
Another conflict prevention option facing the United States is to encourage the deployment of stability 
forces in the run-up to the 2012 general elections.  Opposition leaders requested peacekeepers to end the 
violence and enforce the peace agreement in early 2008.115  Although none were deployed, there is 
convincing evidence that the visible presence of authority figures on the ground could help prevent the 
outbreak and escalation of violence in the future.  According to the KNCHR, violence was averted in one 
Nairobi neighborhood when an officer in the General Service Unit, a joint military and policing outfit, 
negotiated with demonstrators to remain peaceful.  In similar instances in Narok and Mombasa, elders 
and religious leaders convinced agitated members of their communities not to resort to violence.116  
Although the U.S. Civilian Response Corps (CRC) is trained at “engaging in peace-building activities and 
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negotiations,”117 and could thus deploy to at-risk locations to deter or restrain the use of violence, this 
would likely leave too large a footprint and could backfire by delegitimizing the political process as 
externally controlled.  Furthermore, it is improbable that the United States would assume such an active 
role in guaranteeing security during the 2012 elections, especially without extensive precedent of CRC 
effectiveness in such deployments. 
 
An alternative U.S. approach could be to devote resources, perhaps under CRC direction, toward similar 
Kenyan efforts.  The recorded past success of community elders in preventing the outbreak of violence 
suggests that U.S. financial and training support for indigenous organizations could be an effective 
response.  In a 2009 paper detailing the efforts of one Kenyan peace group, George Wachira emphasizes 
the need to encourage grassroots leadership by tapping an “inclusive web of improbable, strategic actors,” 
such as university faculty and vice-chancellors.118  Community and religious elders also offer such 
“improbable” strategic leadership.  Providing civil society grants to improve local reconciliation and 
negotiation capacity could prevent conflict from emerging in the future.119  Regional security personnel 
could also ensure the presence of an impartial rapid response force capable of preventing the escalation of 
conflict if it emerged—thus reducing human suffering.  Providing this clear deterrent to instigators of 
violence would further sustain peace and limit spillover effects. 
 
Long-Term Options for Structural Change 
 
Perhaps the loudest call for change in the wake of the 2007-08 conflict has come from the coalition of 
voices demanding constitutional reform.  Makau Mutua’s extensive study of Kenyan constitutionalism 
argues that “the state cannot be reconstructed without a new constitutional dispensation….  Citizens 
regard a new constitution as the central tool for regaining political order.”120  This belief is widespread 
among the growing Kenyan reform movement and has also gained significant traction in the United 
States.  In early February 2010, Kenyan MPs from the Reform Caucus visited Washington in an attempt 
to build U.S. support for a new Kenyan constitution.  Speaking at CSIS on February 12, members of the 
delegation explained that the proposed constitution seeks primarily to weaken executive power by 
prohibiting MPs from serving in the cabinet, creating a Senate with the power to impeach the president, 
and endowing parliament with the power to approve presidential appointments.  Other groups have also 
expressed the hope that the reform process will improve the Kenyan system of checks and balances, 
especially by strengthening the Kenyan courts through independence from the executive.121  Although this 
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would not immediately impact underlying horizontal inequities, it would weaken the major political 
barriers preventing issues, such as land distribution, from being addressed. 
 
Kenya’s parliament passed the proposed constitution on April 1, 2010, but the document must still face a 
popular referendum.  During the national debate, strong opposition is expected from entrenched political 
dynasties, such as pro-strong-presidency factions, the perpetrators of the 2007-08 violence, and 
potentially the heirs apparent of the principal ethnopolitical parties.  These opposition forces have vast 
resources at their disposal and may choose to manipulate ethnic tensions to defeat the constitution, or use 
fringe issues, such as the legitimacy of the Kadhi (Muslim) courts, to turn religious groups against the 
reform process.  As such, parliamentary leadership has requested U.S. support to protect the national 
debate in summer 2010 from being hijacked by ethnic radicals, or external religious groups.  To this end, 
threatening to impose sanctions on reform opponents espousing tactics that incite civil conflict, similar to 
proposals for punishing past perpetrators, could ensure sincere public deliberations.122  Constitutional 
reform has been a top U.S. policy priority and should continue to be so based on DeMaio’s rubric, as it 
both promotes stable governance by increasing legislative oversight capability, and sustains the cessation 
of violence by reducing the zero-sum nature of the imperial presidency and thus alleviating horizontal 
inequity. 
 
In addition to transferring authority from the executive to the legislative branch, devolution of power from 
the central government to local districts is at the core of democratic reform, as it would ideally make local 
development less contingent on ethnopolitical control of the presidency.123  The Constituency 
Development Fund (CDF) represents one attempt to meet this goal.  Created by President Kibaki in 2003, 
the CDF allocates funds from the national treasury to each electoral constituency for local projects.  
Though it should mitigate the power of ethnic coalitions to monopolize development funding, as each 
constituency benefits equally, the CDF is susceptible to corruption.  Nevertheless, Prime Minister Odinga 
deems the CDF a notable success, as it now comprises about 2.5% of Kenya’s total development 
budget.124 
 
Building local infrastructure through such programs has the potential to reduce conflict both by raising 
perceptions of local economic status and by providing jobs.  According to the UNDP study, a 40 billion 
Kenyan shilling increase in spending on physical infrastructure could create 333,000 jobs nationwide.  
Boosting wage labor would also shrink unemployment, because much of the agriculture sector consists of 
self-reliant small farms that employ only family members.  The World Bank echoes this assessment, 
arguing that “off-farm income… [is] an escape route from poverty.”  By improving the investment 
climate, wage labor opportunities will grow.125  The United States has line items in its foreign assistance 
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budget directed at local development and improving private-sector investment.  Fostering the growth of a 
non-farming working class by providing economic opportunities for landless Kenyans will diminish the 
importance of ethnic group control over land, thus easing horizontal inequity.  By mitigating tension over 
land, this U.S. policy approach clearly meets DeMaio’s goal of sustaining the cessation of conflict. 
 
Another long-term option that has received broad support in the United States is increasing anti-
corruption efforts.  In a speech in Nairobi on January 26, 2010, the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya underlined 
the need to crack down on the corruption that has cost Kenyans billions of dollars (i.e., the Goldenberg 
and Anglo leasing schemes, the Triton oil scam, and the maize scandal).126  Prior remarks by the Assistant 
Secretary for African Affairs similarly stressed the pervasiveness of corporate fraud.  He lamented that 
“most people do not even bother to report corruption because they know no action will be taken.”127  
Although this assessment reinforces the sense of impunity for political misconduct, it also indicates that 
corruption is not driving local conflict.  Proceeds from Kenyan corruption may be financing the political 
violence that preserves the institutional infrastructure behind such misconduct, yet U.S. assistance to fight 
corruption is an indirect means to promote stable governance and sustain the cessation of conflict.  As 
such, the fight against corruption should not receive priority over other more direct policy initiatives. 
 
Encouraging land reform and extensive redistricting to cultivate Kenyan federalism have also received 
some policy attention, but they similarly fail to qualify as U.S. priorities.  The 210 electoral constituencies 
in 2007 varied in size from roughly 13,000 to 250,000 voters.  While this imbalance has been used to 
justify recent redistricting proposals, majimboism undergirds much of the impetus.  Majimboism, or 
ethnic federalism, has existed in Kenya since at least 1991, when Kalenjin politicians sought to reclaim 
the Rift Valley.  According to Bratton and Kimenyi’s public opinion polling, about half of adult Kenyans 
view majimboism “as a code word for redistributive politics,” and about a quarter feel that such a policy 
would result in forced migration back to their homelands.  During the 2007-08 conflict, such flight to 
traditional ethnic territories was common.  In its worst manifestation, this forced geographical 
concentration has fueled ethnic cleansing.  Although some land-reform proposals reject ethnic federalism, 
and instead focus on communal land-use policies, most call for some sort of widespread redistribution, 
which would be controversial and could potentially incite a new wave of civil violence.128  U.S. support 
for such policies would ultimately only aggravate the winner-take-all nature of the presidency as state 
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The key recommendations that should emerge as top priorities for U.S. foreign policy toward Kenya 
focus on preventing future outbreaks of violence, which is a necessary condition for continued regional 
stability and ongoing development efforts. 
 
Recommendation 1:  Support local mediation strategies to prevent conflict by offering financial, training, 
and logistical assistance to build the non-violent rapid response capacity of Kenyan peace organizations 
and community leadership. 
 
Jennifer DeMaio observes that “reliable early warnings provide the time necessary to prepare for short-
term containment [of violence]… and [to] implement longer-term proactive strategies [to prevent 
violence].”129  This analysis’s quantitative and qualitative findings that violence worsens with increasing 
levels of horizontal inequity should enhance U.S. early warning capabilities and improve efforts to predict 
areas at risk of civil conflict.  The United States can use these tools to support indigenous organizations 
able to intercede in at-risk locations to prevent the outbreak of violence by developing early warning 
networks that monitor indicators of horizontal inequity and that are on alert for conflict triggers.  In 
anticipation of the 2012 elections, the United States should offer CRC resources to train community 
elders in conflict transformation and provide logistical support to transport Kenyan negotiators to at-risk 
locations determined by early warning models.  This non-violent rapid response mechanism could further 
prevent the escalation of ethnic strife by empowering local community leadership as an alternative to 
national institutions that have a legacy of supporting political violence. 
 
Recommendation 2:  Increase foreign assistance for non-agricultural local development projects. 
 
As evident in this study’s analytical findings, alleviating local horizontal inequity is the most important 
long-term component of preventing future outbreaks of civil conflict.  As previously discussed, current 
U.S. foreign assistance programming has prioritized agricultural competitiveness, which if sustained will 
likely lead to increased horizontal inequity due to existing ethnic-based imbalances in land distribution.130  
Alternatively, giving precedence to non-farming development will provide landless Kenyans with a way 
to escape poverty, thus diminishing the importance of land ownership and alleviating horizontal inequity.  
As such, the United States should restructure its foreign assistance budget to support this more effective 
route to peace building and target new non-agriculture program funding toward predicted at-risk 
locations. 
 
Recommendation 3:  Continue to support Kenya’s constitutional reform process and emphasize that 
enhanced accountability will boost U.S. willingness to increase development assistance. 
 
Alleviating the inflammatory effect presidential competition has on Kenyan civil conflict requires an 
infusion of compromise into the political system.  Prior to the 2007 general elections, Secretary of State 
Rice spoke to both principal candidates, stressing that they must be ready and willing to accept defeat.131  
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This cautionary advice proved useless largely because the power of the Kenyan executive is too great to 
encourage concessions.  To remedy this, the United States has already devoted funds and legal expertise 
to support constitutional reform.  Additionally, the United States should incentivize elite support by 
conveying its willingness to increase foreign assistance to Kenya as a reward for enhanced democratic 
accountability.  Furthermore, ensuring that defeated presidential candidates will still have a meaningful 
role in state governance will go far in minimizing the winner-take-all nature of electoral politics.  
However, to prove it is worthy of increased authority, parliament must improve its legislative oversight 
structures and mature beyond the corruption and ethnic divisiveness that have historically plagued many 
of its members.132  As such, the United States should continue to hold MPs accountable to good 
governance practices and expand its already active role in improving the functionality of Kenya’s 
democratic institutions. 
 
Recommendation 4:  Impose direct sanctions on the perpetrators of the 2007-08 violence and threaten 
similar treatment of future instigators of conflict during the summer 2010 constitutional referendum, the 
2012 general elections, and beyond. 
 
Imposing direct sanctions, such as asset freezes and visa bans, on the instigators and perpetrators of 
violence during past and future elections and referendums will weaken the national legacy of impunity.  
Economic penalties will present clear disincentives for employing ethnic hate speech, manipulating 
perceptions of horizontal inequity, and using fringe issues that cut along ethnopolitical cleavages to 
tamper with popular reform movements.  Due to the importance of foreign assistance to development, the 
United States possesses significant leverage over Kenyan officials, and can thus proactively ensure 
politicians do not incite future conflict. 
 
Recommendation 5:  Support Kenyan monitoring and evaluation efforts. 
 
As a corollary recommendation, the United States should devote funding and expertise to help develop 
Kenyan monitoring and evaluation (M&E) programs.  Although Kenya has been proactive in developing 
its M&E infrastructure, including beginning to collect district-level M&E data in 2005 and granting its 
national statistics bureau semi-autonomy in 2007, further improvement is needed.133  Aiding Kenyan 
M&E will enhance U.S. ability to regularly assess the impact of U.S. foreign policy on the underlying 
causes of conflict in Kenya.  Such information is crucial for identifying any future course corrections that 





After analyzing numerous third party interventions in African civil wars, Jennifer DeMaio concludes, 
“Peace cannot be externally imposed on groups in conflict: it must be fomented from the bottom-up.”134  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Flawed Elections,” 21. 
132 Mutua, 268; U.S. Department of State, “Reform, Partnership, and the Future of Kenya;” KNCHR, 167; World 
Bank, Kenya Poverty and Inequality Assessment, 9. 
133 World Bank, Kenya Poverty and Inequality Assessment, 177-181. 
134 DeMaio, 195. 
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This is an important lesson for U.S. foreign policy toward Kenya.  Both quantitative and qualitative 
analysis of Kenya’s recent history of civil conflict reveals that deeply rooted, localized horizontal 
inequities along ethnic lines represent the primary determinants of the emergence of violence.  This 
micro-level reality requires that the United States pursue the bottom-up policy approach DeMaio 
identifies.  As such, focusing U.S. efforts on conflict management by aiding local mediation strategies, 
increasing non-agricultural foreign assistance, supporting constitutional reform, and punishing conflict 
agitators will advance the U.S. interest in preventing future outbreaks of violence in Kenya.  In early 
2008, Kenya looked to be on the brink of state collapse.  However, determined international mediation 
efforts, and what Makau Mutua describes as Kenyans’ commitment to “the idea of a viable country,”135 
halted the downfall.  Now, moving ever closer to the next political flashpoint in the forthcoming 2012 
general elections, the United States has a responsibility to intensify its efforts to minimize Kenyan 
horizontal inequity and head off a return to the brink of disaster. 
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